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Probing the Discriminatory Effects of
Employee Selection Procedures with
Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII
Elaine W. Shoben*
Last term the Supreme Court handed down three decisions in
which it defined with some precision the proper use of statistics in
Title VT cases. Those decisions filled a void that had existed
since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., but they left some questions
unanswered. In this article Professor Shoben discusses those
decisions and addresses the issues still unresolved. She proposes
a structured framework for the systematic analysis of disparate
impact cases that is consistent with, yet builds upon, the three
recent decisions. In addition, Professor Shoben considers whether
allowing a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case with statistics
alone violates the Act's guarantee that it does not require prefer-
ential hiring.
All employers use some method for screening potential employees and
excluding certain groups of applicants from consideration for employment.
A variety of objective or subjective criteria serve as selection.aids, such as
tests, interviews, education requirements, physical requirements, or any
other measure that the employer believes will predict the quality of an
applicant as a future employee. The use of criteria that have not been
demonstrated to be good predictors of employee performance, however,
creates the risk that otherwise qualified applicants will be unfairly excluded
by the hiring process. Moreover, if a selection requirement has the effect of
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College; J.D. 1974, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Preparation of this
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excluding disproportionately a group on the basis of race, sex,. or ethnicity,
then its use by the employer constitutes an unlawful employment practice
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 unless the employer can
demonstrate the business necessity of the requirement. 2 In Title VII litiga-
tion the term "disparate impact analysis" refers to plaintiff's statistical
proof of the discriminatory effect of defendant employer's hiring practices. 3
Plaintiff's statistics may show, for example, that a height requirement
disproportionately excludes women from a job or that the percentage of
blacks in defendant's work force is substantially lower than the percentage
of blacks in the surrounding community.
Disparate impact analysis has assumed an increasingly significant role
in Title VII litigation in the seven years since the Supreme Court first
accepted it in the landmark decision Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 4 Griggs
established that discrimination under Title VII is not limited to overt acts of
unequal treatment; the Act also prohibits neutral employment practices "fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation" unless the employer can show
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-
352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)). Title VII provides, in part, that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), the Supreme Court held that an employer can violate Title VII in the absence of
discriminatory purpose if his employment practices have a discriminatory effect.
For convenience, this article will use the phrase "race, sex, or ethnicity" to refer to the
groups protected by Title VII.
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which held that a Title VII violation can
be established by proof that defendant's employment practices have a discriminatory effect,
allowed employers this defense. "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431. This article will refer interchangeably to the Griggs
defense as proof of business necessity and proof of job relatedness.
This article analyzes cases of Title VII discrimination premised on a demonstration of
discriminatory impact or effect. It does not address instances of overt discrimination based on
religion, sex, or national origin, for which the bona fide occupational qualification provision
may serve as a statutorily-created jusitification for discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l)
(1970) See Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification,
55 TEXAS L. REv. 1025, 1025 n.4, 1034 n.57 (1977).
3. Title VII claims based upon "disparate impact" should be distinguished from claims of
"disparate treatment." The similarity in the names of these dissimilar theories of recovery
under Title VII is unfortunate because neither of these terms is defined by, nor even appears in,
the Act itself. In a disparate treatment case plaintiff alleges and must prove purposeful
discrimination in defendant employer's hiring practices, although sometimes discriminatory
motive can be inferred from facts showing inequality in treatment. On the other hand, a
disparate impact claim alleges only the discriminatory effect of facially neutral employment
practices, and plaintiff need not prove that defendant intended to discriminate. International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). See generally B. SCHLE & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15-25 (1976).
4. -401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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their business necessity. 5 This operational definition of discrimination in
employment has caused the development of a complex body of disparate
impact law. In Griggs the discriminatory effect of the employment practices
was easily seen because the facts disclosed virtually complete exclusion of
blacks from the better jobs. 6 Diploma and testing requirements adopted by
Duke Power Co. had kept blacks in the laborer jobs they had held historical-
ly under an overt system of discrimination. Employment discrimination
cases since Griggs still reveal instances of the total exclusion of a group
from certain jobs, but now the more typical case concerns a partial exclu-
sion, or underrepresentation, of certain groups. 7
An example will illustrate the complexities of disparate impact analysis
in a case of partial exclusion. 8 Assume that a black plaintiff brings a Title
VII action alleging that defendant employer engages in hiring practices that
have the effect of discriminating against his racial group. The job in
question is guard work in defendant's private guard service company, and
there are three employment requirements: (1) a passing score on a written
test; (2) previous military or guard work experience; and (3) approval from
the personnel manager following a subjective and standardless interview.
Plaintiff proves that blacks constitute twenty percent of the population in the
city where defendant is located and hires, but that the company's work force
is only five percent black. Plaintiff also produces statistics showing that
whites pass the written test at a rate significantly greater than blacks.
Defendant employer attempts to rebut plaintiff's case in three ways.
First, defendant produces data concerning his recent hiring that show that
twenty percent of his newest employees are black. This proportion compares
favorably with the twenty percent representation of blacks in the general
population, even though defendant's total work force remains only five'
percent black. Second, the company argues that although the written test is
passed by whites at a greater rate than blacks, the military or guard work
5. Id. at 431. A plaintiff may also base a claim of Title VII discrimination on facts showing
that an employer treated him or her unequally as an individual. In a 1972 opinion, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, the Supreme Court established the requirements for a
prima facie case of individual discrimination:
(i) that plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and \ias qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Once plaintiff has established these elements the burden shifts "to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id.
6. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th Cir. 1970) (only three blacks
promoted from Labor Department), aff'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
8. This example is based on parts of the following three cases: Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); Smith v. City
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experience requirement operates in favor of blacks because a disproportion-
ate number of the veterans among the applicants are black. Last, defendant
urges that if an overall work force comparison is made, the relevant labor
market is not the general population, but only those people who work as
private guards. If only five percent of the people who are private guards are
black, the company argues, then its hiring practices do not disproportionate-
ly exclude black guards.
The litigants in such a case might introduce a variety of other statistical
data, limited only by the requirement of relevance and the imagination of
counsel. Trial courts have had the task of choosing which figures are most
probative to assess whether defendant's practices act as a barrier to a racial,
sexual, or ethnic group. The Griggs prototype of total exclusion does not
provide an easy answer to the question whether the facts of the example are
sufficient to show disproportionate exclusion. A judgment whether the
evidence shows disproportionate exclusion of a group requires, as the term
suggests, a comparison of proportions. The problems arise in deciding
which proportions to compare and how to assess whether a difference
between the chosen proportions shows discriminatory effect.
Partial exclusion cases such as this hypothetical one have caused the
development of varied approaches to disparate impact analysis. 9 An elabora-
tion on the meaning of the Griggs disparate impact standard has been
needed from the Supreme Court, and last term that need was fulfilled in
part. In a trio of employment discrimination cases decided in the summer of
1977,10 the Court addressed several disparate impact issues. The devel-
opments in the interpretation and implementation of disparate impact analy-
sis, and particularly the recent refinements made by the Supreme Court, are
the subjects of this article. Part I discusses the issues recently resolved by
the Court and addresses the competing considerations underlying several
issues yet unresolved. Parts II and I make two proposals concerning the
future of disparate impact analysis. The first is a step-by-step analytical
structure for approaching disparate impact cases that avoids the doctrinal
pitfalls into which some courts and administrative bodies have fallen. The
second is a proposed resolution of an issue left open by the Court, whether
the use- of disparate impact analysis conflicts with the statutory guarantee
of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
9. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (5th Cir. 1974); Thompson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 416 F. Supp. 972, 980-81 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 220 (8th
Cir. 1977); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873,
modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
10. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736(1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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that preferential hiring is not required. This article argues that disparate
impact analysis is merely a tool for discerning the effects of employment
practices and is fully compatible with the Act's goal of placement based
solely on merit.
I. The Development of Disparate Impact Analysis
The Supreme Court has twice noted that Congress enacted Title VII to
remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classifications." ' t In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. t 2 the Court
held that facially neutral qualification standards may fall within this pro-
scription if they operate in practice to exclude disproportionately members
of a particular racial, sexual, or ethnic group. Thus, plaintiff need not
produce evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive or intent to prove
a violation of Title VII; he can establish a prima facie case with a showing
that the employment standard in question selects applicants in a discriminat-
ory pattern. Defendant employer can respond to plaintiff's statistical show-
ing in two ways. He may attempt to rebut the inference of discriminatory
effect by introducing his own statistical evidence or, even if he does not
contest the discriminatory effect of the challenged standards, he can defend
by showing that those standards are related to job performance.' 3 Because,
the requirements for a showing of job relatedness are rigorous, however, the
second method of defense has generally not been successful, 14 and thus Title
11. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2726 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
12. 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1970). The Supreme Court subse-
quently added that if the employer proves that the requirements are job related, plaintiff may
then show the availability of other selection devices that serve the legitimate business purpose
of defendant without the discriminatory impact. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 .(1975). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1972).
14. See Johnson, Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs and the
Death of Employee Testing, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1257 (1976); Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV. 463, 466 (1973). In Hender-
son v. First Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 531, 545 (M.D. Ala. 1973), the court well expressed the
difficulty of validation:
The Court has noted for the record and so finds that there is no pre-employment
test, given and acted upon by any employer in the United States, or known to exist or
yet devised, which has been determined by EEOC to meet the requirements contained
in Regulation Paragraph 1607 [test validation].
Validation requirements for tests challenged as violative of the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection, however, now appear to be less stringent than Title VII requirements. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249-52 (1976) (civil service test for police officers). In the
area of Title VII, the Court recently expanded the concept of the "bona fide occupational
qualification" exemption from the Act for sex discrimination. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct.
2720, 2728-30 (1977) (height and weight requirements for prison guards). See Sirota, supra note
2, at 1025, 1039, 1050, 1070-71. Although these cases may indicate the Court's current inclina-
tion toward lessening the difficulty of defendant's burden of proof, the Court has previously
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VII cases often turn on the employer's statistical rebuttal of plaintiff's prima
facie case of disproportionate exclusion. 15
Despite this practical emphasis on proof of disparate impact, until the
summer of 1977 the Supreme Court had not provided substantial guidance
on the mechanics of disparate impact analysis, but instead left the task to the
lower courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 16 In the cornerstone decision, Griggs, the challenged qualification
standards were completion of high school and satisfactory scores on two
professionally prepared aptitude tests. 17 The Court concluded that the two
standards disproportionately excluded blacks, but it relegated to a brief
footnote the specific evidence that supported that finding.18 Because the
guidelines promulgated by the EEOC discussed proof of disparate impact
with no more detail than did the Supreme Court in Griggs,19 the lower
courts had the burden of developing the evidentiary standards that would
control plaintiff's statistical proof of disparate impact. They have allowed
plaintiffs to prove disparate impact and thus establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by three distinct methods. The courts derived two of these
methods from the footnote in Griggs that set forth the evidence on which the
finding of disproportionate exclusion was based. They developed indepen-
dently the third method, which was only recently approved by the Supreme
Court.
The first method of proof calls for an examination of the effect of the
requirement on the general population group from which defendant employ-
er hires. It entails a comparison of the percentage of blacks or women in the
general population excluded by a particular employment requirement with
the percentage of whites or males in the general population that would be
endorsed the guidelines on testing promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 140-43 (1976) (deference not given to the EEOC guidelines on disability benefits for
pregnancy). See generally Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment
Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 89-94.
15. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 1161.
16. See generally Lopatka, supra note 14.
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
18. In North Carolina, 1960 census statistics show that, while 34% of white males had
completed high school, only 12% of Negro males had done so.
Similarly, with respect to standardized tests, the EEOC in one case found that use
of a battery of tests, including the Wonderlic and Bennett tests used by the Company
in the instant case, resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests, as compared with only
6% of the blacks.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (citations omitted).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1976) (discrimination defined as use of unvalidated test that
"adversely affects" employment opportunities of protected groups; "adverse effect" not
defined). The Department of Justice, Department of Labor, and Civil Service Commission have
promulgated a set of their own guidelines, the Federal Executive Agency Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures (Agency Guidelines), 41 Fed. Reg. 51,744 (1976) (effective
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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excluded by the requirement.2 0 This approach to proof of disparate impact
was inspired by the Supreme Court's discussion in Griggs of the high school
diploma requirement. In a footnote the Court cited United States census
statistics which showed that thirty-four percent of the white males in North
Carolina (the state in which defendant Duke Power Co. hired) were high
school graduates while only twelve percent of the black males in the state
had completed high school. 21 Because the effect of the diploma requirement
on the general population was to exclude blacks disproportionately, the
Court held the requirement to be a barrier to the employment of blacks that
could be justified only by a showing of job relatedness. 2 The Court recently
reaffirmed the validity of this method of proof in Dothard v. Rawlinson. 23
In that case the Court upheld a finding that minimum height and weight
requirements for Alabama prison guards discriminated against women.
24
National statistics showed that the height and weight requirements in combi-
nation excluded forty-one percent of the female population but less than one
percent of the male population.2 5
The second method of proof of disparate impact consists of an exami-
nation of the pass-fail rates of actual applicants. The failure rate of black or
female applicants on a particular test or other scored requirement is
compared with the failure rate of white or male applicants. If plaintiff
establishes that members of his racial, sexual, or ethnic group are disqual-
ified by the requirement more frequently than are other groups, an inference
of discrimination arises. 26 This method is also derived from the footnote in
Dec. 23, 1976, as 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-3.1 to .14). The Agency Guidelines define disparate impact,
see notes 133-38 infra & accompanying text, but the EEOC refused to subscribe to the Agency
Guidelines and republished its own, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,984 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (disqualification of
applicants with conviction records); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973) (high school diploma requirement); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1972) (disqualification of applicants with arrest records).
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
22. The Court further held that defendant had not shown either requirement to be job
related. Id. at 431-32.
23. 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
24. Id. at 2727-28.
25. Id. at 2727. The Court justified use of national statistics on the ground that there was no
reason to believe that the physical characteristics of Alabama men and women differed
markedly from those of the national population.
26. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Coopersmith v. Roude-
bush, 517 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906
(5th Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Harless v. Duck, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1616 (N.D. Ohio 1977);
United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
This approach is sometimes confused with an applicant flow approach, which compares
the rate of applicant acceptance after the entire hiring process is completed. See text accom-
panying notes 98-105 infra. An examination of the pass-fail rates of applicants on individual
HeinOnline -- 56 Tex. L. Rev.  7 1977-1978
Texas Law Review
Griggs that set forth the evidence supporting plaintiff's case. There the
Court observed that the aptitude tests used by defendant disqualified more
blacks than whites. 27
The second method of proving disparate impact is the same in principle
as the first method except that only a sample of the population is used, the
sample being those who have applied for the job in question. Because only
the effect of the requirement on actual applicants is examined, the second
method is a less accurate measure than the first method of the exclusionary
effect of a particular requirement on all potential applicants. Nevertheless,
when lack of information precludes an assessment of the effect of a particu-
lar requirement on the general population, the second method of proof is a
workable alternative to the first. National statistics furnish information on
certain physical characteristics and educational qualifications of groups
defined by race, sex, or ethnicity, but a company-developed test cannot be
administered to everyone in the state in order to measure its effect on such
groups. In the latter situation, proof of disparate impact among actual
applicants may create an inference of discrimination and shift the burden to
defendant. Thus, the second method of proving disparate impact is essen-
tially a less accurate variant of the first method, which is necessary when the
employment requirement at issue is a test or other scored or pass-fail device
and when information about the effect of the requirement on the general
population is unavailable. 28
The third method of proof compares the racial composition of defen-
dant employer's work force with the racial composition of the community in
which defendant hires. 29 Plaintiff can create an inference of discrimination
by showing, for example, that blacks constitute forty percent of the relevant
labor market but that defendant's work force is only two-percent black.
Unlike the first two methods of proving disparate impact, this method finds
requirements, however, allows consideration of the effect of separate components of the
selection process, such as a written test.
27. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971). The Court handled this point
rather cavalierly. Lacking evidence on the pass-fail rates of the blacks and whites taking the
tests at Duke Power Co., the Court referred to an EEOC decision that gave the comparative
pass-fail rates of blacks and whites on a battery of tests including, but not limited to, the two
tests used by Duke Power Co. Id.
28. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof
Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421 (8th Cir. 1970); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp.
873, modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Butsee Butts v. Nichols,
381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
The term "employer's work force" is used in this context to mean either the entire force or
a single job category.
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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no support in Griggs, but was devised independently by the lower courts.
Only recently, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States30
and Hazelwood School District v. United States,31 did the Supreme Court
approve this method of proof. The Court's discussion of the community
composition comparison approach in Teamsters and Hazelwood demon-
strates that that method of proof contains additional complexities. In Hazel-
wood the Court noted that a definition of the relevant labor market is a
preliminary step to a comparison of the racial composition of defendant's
work force with the racial composition of the community. 32 In both Team-
sters and Hazelwood the Court intimated that defendant could rebut the
inference of discrimination arising from an unfavorable comparison of his
work force with the community by showing that since passage of the Civil
Rights Act he had hired new employees in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 33
The community composition comparison approach merits fuller discussion
because of these refinements and because its proper application was only
recently defined by the Supreme Court.
A. The Community Composition Comparison Approach
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,34 Hazelwood
School District v. United States,3S and Dothard v. Rawlinson ,36 all decided
during the summer of 1977, collectively affirm the usefulness of disparate
impact analysis in Title VII litigation. Perhaps the most significant aspect of
these cases is that the Supreme Court in Teamsters and Hazelwood endors-
ed the community composition comparison approach and clarified the pro-
per application of that method of proving a Title VII violation. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority in Teamsters and Hazelwood, explained
the rationale underlying the community composition comparison approach:
"[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative
of the racial and ethnic compositions of the population in the community
from which employees are hired. ' 37 The theory is that discriminatory
practices are revealed in their results; over time, nondiscriminatory hiring
30. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
31. 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
32. Id. at 2742 n.13.
33. Id. at 2742-44; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340-42
(1977).
34. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
35. 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
36. 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
37. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2741 (1977) (quoting Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)).
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practices should result in a work force with a composition roughly identical
to that of the labor market in the surrounding community.
The Court first discussed the -community composition comparison
approach in a footnote in Teamsters. 38 In that case the United States brought
Title VII pattern or practice suits39 against a nationwide common carrier of
motor freight and the union that represented a large group of the truck
drivers employed by the common carrier. 40 The Government alleged that
defendants had purposefully discriminated against racial minorities in the
hiring of "line drivers," who do long distance hauling between company
terminals. 41 The employment statistics revealed that almost all the black and
Spanish-surnamed employees were local city drivers or servicemen, while
whites held virtually all the higher paying and more desirable line driver
positions.42 Moreover, a comparison of the racial composition of defen-
dant's line driver work force with the racial composition of the communities
in which defendant hired supported dramatically the inference of purposeful
discrimination; in many metropolitan areas of substantial black population
defendant employed not a single black line driver.43
38. 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment
of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of
such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described,
the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the
United States ..
The Teamsters Court observed that the Government's burden in a pattern or practice
action is .to prove "more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic
discriminatory acts. It [has] to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial
discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure .... " 431 U.S. at 336.
40. The two 'cases against the union and the trucking company were, respectively, Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States and T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. v. United States. The cases
were decided together on certiorari. 431 U.S. at 334.
41. Id. at 335.
42. With a single exception, defendant did not employ a black as a line driver until 1969. Id.
at 337. In 1971 defendant's total work force was 5% black and 4% Spanish-surnamed American,
but its line diver work force was only 0.4% black and 0.3% Spanish-surnamed American. Id.
43. Id. Teamsters, unlike Griggs, was a disparate treatment case; the Government alleged
and had to prove a pattern or practice of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Id. at 335 &
n. 15; see note 3 supra. The Government presented testimony from individuals who related over
forty specific instances of overt discrimination. For example, one black who wanted to transfer
to a line driver job was told by the terminal manager that the company was not "ready for this
right now" and that there would be "problems on the road . . . with different people,
Caucasian, et cetera." 431 U.S. at 338 n. 19. A Chicano who applied for a line driver job was
told he had a strike against him because, according to the personnel officer, "[y]ou're a
Chicano, and as far as we know, there isn't a Chicano driver in the system." Id.
The function of the statistical evidence was to complement this testimony of intentional
discrimination. Disparity between the racial composition of defendant's line driver work force
and the racial composition of the communities in which defendant hired was probative because
"such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination," id. at 339 n.20, and the
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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A few weeks after Teamsters was decided, Justice Stewart again wrote
for the Court an opinion in which he discussed more fully the community
composition comparison approach. Hazelwood School District v. United
States,' like Teamsters, was a pattern or practice suit in which the Govern-
ment alleged purposeful discrimination. Defendant was a Missouri suburban
school district, and the issue was whether it discriminated against blacks in
its hiring of school teachers. It was undisputed that less than two percent of
defendant's teacher work force was black,4 5 and the controversy concerned
the appropriate comparative figure necessary to assess whether two percent
was a disproportionately low representation of blacks. The district court had
compared the percentage of black teachers to the percentage of black
students in the Hazelwood School District, and because there were few
black students in Hazelwood it found the two percent figure nonprobative of
discrimination.46 The Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the proper
comparative figure to defendant's two-percent black representation was the
percentage of blacks in the relevant labor market, which the court defined as
teachers in the area composed of St. Louis County and St. Louis City.47 The
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' adoption of the community
comparison approach and with the relevant labor market refinement to that
approach:
There can be no doubt, in light of the Teamsters case, that
the District Court's comparison of Hazelwood's teacher work
force to its student population fundamentally misconceived the
role of statistics in employment discrimination cases. . . . [A]
proper comparison was between the racial composition of Hazel-
wood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified
public school teacher population in the relevant labor market. 48
In Hazelwood the Court thus reaffirmed the validity of the community
composition comparison approach to proof of Title VII violations. The
testimony of specific instances of discrimination then "brought the cold numbers convincingly
to life," id. at 339. Logically, community composition comparison statistics should be equally
relevant in a disparate impact case. Indeed, such statistics are more probative of the proposition
that an employment practice or selection requirement has a disparate impact than they are of
disparate treatment because the statistics do not address the issue whether an employment
practice or selection requirement was used with intent to discriminate. Nevertheless, because
Teamsters was a disparate treatment case in which the Government produced evidence of
purposeful discrimination, the Court approved the community composition comparison ap-
proach without holding that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of either disparate
impact or disparate treatment with statistics alone. Part II.B. of this article addresses that issue.
44. 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
45. Id. at 2740.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2742.
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Hazelwood Court, however, defined more carefully than did the Court in
Teamsters the proper application of that approach and expanded upon
Teamsters in at least two significant respects. First, the Court accepted the
usefulness of the community composition-comparison approach even when
the comparison demonstrated only partial exclusion of blacks from defen-
dant's work force. In Teamsters racial minorities were almost totally ex-
cluded from the more desirable line driver jobs, 49 and the Court'sapproval
of the community composition comparison approach was arguably an over-
broad statement that was unnecessary to its decision. In Hazelwood, how-
ever, the Court reaffirmed the validity of that method of proof when blacks
were only partially excluded from the job in question.50 The Hazelwood
Court stated that "gross statistical disparities" could in a proper case be
sufficiently probative of a pattern or practice of discrimination to shift the
burden of proof to defendant. 51 In a footnote the Court said that disparate
impact could be shown by an underrepresentation unlikely to occur by
chance alone, as calculated by statistical probability.52
Second, the Court in Hazelwood refined the community composition
comparison approach by its adoption of the relevant labor market concept.
In Teamsters Justice Stewart wrote that the racial composition of defen-
dant's work force should be compared with the racial composition of the
"population in the community from which employees are hired. ' ' 53 In
Hazelwood he clarified that language and stated that in some circumstances
49. In a footnote the Court listed several major metropolitan areas where blacks
constituted a substantial portion of the population, but where defendant's line driver work force
remained 100% white. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 n. 17
(1977). Moreover, the Court referred with approval to the characterization of the circuit court
that "the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came not from a misuse
of statistics but from 'the inexorable zero.' " Id. at 342 n.23.
50. By the end of the 1973 school year, 22 (1.8%) of defendant's 1,231 school teachers were
black. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2739 (1977).
51. Id. at 2741. Despite the breadth of this statement, Hazelwood, like Teamsters, did not
decide the issue whether a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with
statistics alone. See note 43 supra. Hazelwood was a disparate treatment, rather than a
disparate impact, case, id. at 2741 n.12, and the Government produced evidence of "specific
instances of alleged discrimination against 55 unsuccessful Negro applicants," id. at 2739. Part
III.B. of this article addresses this issue left open in Teamsters and Hazelwood.
52. Id. at 2742 n. 14, 2743 n. 17. Citing a jury discrimination case decided earlier in the term,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977), the Court discussed the use of probability
theory for a precise statistical calculation of the probability that employment decisions were
made randomly with respect to race. 97 S. Ct. at 2742 n.14, 2743 n.17 Justice Stevens,.
dissenting, also referred to probability calculation. Id. at 2747 n.5.
For an excellent explanation of probability theory, see Finkelstein, The Application of
Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 338 (1966);
Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and
Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. Rev. 387 (1975).
53. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
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defendant's work force should be compared with the racial composition of a
relevant labor market rather than with the racial composition of an entire
demographic community. Stewart explained that if the job in question
requires skills commonly held or easily acquired by members of the general
community, then a general population comparison is probative, but if the
job requires special qualifications, the proper comparison is with that por-
tion of the labor market whose members are qualified for the job.54
The logic of this distinction is well illustrated by its application to the
facts of Teamsters and HazeIwood. In Hazelwood Justice Stewart explained
that the ability to drive a truck, the sole qualification for the line driver job at
issue in Teamsters, was a skill possessed or easily acquired by many
people. Because many members of the general population were qualified or
easily trained for employment by defendant, a comparison between the
racial composition of defendant's line driver work force and the racial
composition of the general population in the surrounding geographic area
was probative of whether defendant discriminated in hiring. 55 Hazelwood,
however, concerned the job of teaching public school, which required
special qualifications neither possessed nor easily acquired by most mem-
bers of the general population.5 6 Because only a segment of the population
was qualified for employment by defendant and the racial composition of
the qualified group may vary from the racial composition of the general
population, a comparison of defendant's work force with the general popu-
lation would not be probative of discrimination. Accordingly, Justice
Stewart explained that the proper comparison was with the relevant labor
market for the hiring of public school teachers-that is, the group of
qualified public school teachers in the geographic area where the school
district hires.5 7
Relevant labor market analysis based on this dichotomy entails a two-
part inquiry. A court must first isolate the essential character of the job in
question and define the skills necessary to perform the job. It must then
ascertain whether those skills are acquired only after extensive education or
training or whether the skills are commonly held or easily learned.
Teachers, 58 medical doctors,5 9 and lawyers 60 must have skills requiring
54. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2742 n.13 (1977).
55. Id.
56. The Court did not describe the special qualifications required for teaching school, see
id., but a teaching certificate would be one that most members of the population neither
possessed nor could easily acquire.
57. Id. at 2742.
58. E.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
59. E.g., Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th
Cir. 1967).
60. E.g., Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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sufficient education and training that only those possessing the necessary
skills compose the relevant labor market. On the other hand, general-skills
office workers, 6 1 truck drivers, 62 police officers, 63 fire fighters, 64 and labor-
ers65 can easily acquire the skills necessary to perform their jobs. For these
types of positions, a comparison of defendant's work force with the racial,
sexual, or ethnic composition of the general population in the surrounding
community is appropriate. For certain other types of jobs an analysis of the
relevant labor market will be more difficult. For example, jobs that require
an intermediate length of time for training will be hard to fit into the
dichotomy between general skills and special skills. Many machinery jobs,
which require only a few weeks training, are properly considered general
skills jobs, while a medical doctor, whose skills are the product of years of
training, clearly has a special skills job. Relevant labor market analysis is
less easily applied, however, to a job that takes a few months of instruction,
such as a technician in a health-care field. 6 Similarly, jobs that can be filled
either by people with experience within a company or by specially trained
people outside the company will be difficult to categorize according to the
dichotomy between general skills and special skills. For example, upper-
level clerking jobs, junior executive jobs, and stockbroker jobs will not
easily be classified at the entry level even though employees ultimately
attain professional or semiprofessional skills. 67
The initial inquiry under an analysis of the relevant labor market calls
61. General office skills presumably would include reception duties, filing, mail sorting,
switchboard operating, and basic typing. But see Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374 (5th
Cir. 1974) (typing skill of 60 words per minute considered specialized).
62. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Mal-
donado v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
63. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), aft'g 385 F. Supp. 543
(N.D. Ill. 1974); Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975).
64. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873,
modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
65. E.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. Compare Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (airline flight
officers; comparison not limited to minorities possessing defendant's qualifications), with
Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 416 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (computer pro-
grammer; comparison limited to minorities with relevant minimal qualifications), aff'd, 552
F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1977).
67. Compare, e.g., Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1344, vac'd and
remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809, on remand, 566 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant
had burden of proving job relatedness once plaintiff showed underrepresentation of blacks in
supervisory positions), with United States v. National Lead, 315 F. Supp. 912, 919 (D.C. Mo.
1970) (plaintiff failed to show that minorities excluded from supervisory positions were qual-
ified), aff'd, 438 F.2d 935 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally Gates v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 492 F.2d
292 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant had burden of justifying promotion-from-within policy for
accountants).
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
HeinOnline -- 56 Tex. L. Rev.  14 1977-1978
Disparate Impact Analysis
for an examination of the character of the job in question and a definition of
the skills necessary to perform the job. This inquiry should be controlled by
the nature of the job rather than the employer's actual requirements for the
position; an employer should not be able to limit the relevant labor market to
people with a college education simply by creating a diploma requirement.
In Hazelwood, the Court accepted that the relevant labor market was limited
to persons with a college diploma because historically, and by state licens-
ing requirements, a college education is considered a requirement for teach-
ing public school. An overreliance on historical assumptions to answer the
inquiry whether a job requires general or special skills, however, could
become a means of allowing employers indirectly to define the relevant
labor markets with which their work force will be compared. Similarly,
although the presence of state licensing requirements will usually provide a
convenient, and presumably objective, way to determine whether special
skills are necessary for a job, they should not be conclusive of the issue. For
example, in some areas employers typically hire prospective real estate
agents "off the street" to train them for meeting the state licensing require-
ments. In such a case, the relevant labor market should not be limited to
those people possessing a license or the training necessary to obtain one.
Instead, the racial composition of defendant's work force should be
compared with the racial composition of the general population in the area
where he hires. 68
Either inquiry under a relevant labor market analysis may present a
close question. A court may be unsure whether a particular skill is required
for performance of a job or it may be unsure whether a necessary skill is
easily learned or is acquired only after extensive training. When defendant
argues for a relevant labor market approach and a court is uncertain which
comparison is more appropriate, it should favor the general population
comparison. The reason the general population approach is preferable in
close cases is that if disparate impact is found, the effect is not to hold
defendant guilty of illegal discrimination but to shift the burden to defendant
to prove the job relatedness of the type of requirement that he claims makes
the job a special skills one. 69 For example, defendant might argue that a
68. In Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), the court rejected
defendant's argument that the composition of its flight officer work force must be compared
with the composition of the group of qualified black applicants. The court held plaintiff
established a prima facie case with a showing that blacks were underrepresented in defendant's
work force when defendant trained its employees and had at times waived at least one of its
selection requirements. Id. at 218-19. The court subsequently held, however, that defendant
successfully showed its selection requirements to be job related. Id. at 219-20.
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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college degree in business is a necessary requirement for an entry level
supervisory position, and that the relevant labor market therefore consists of
those persons who possess business degrees. The typical underrepresenta-
tion of blacks and women among persons with a business education would
be favorable to a defendant with a similar underrepresentation in his work
force. A court applying a community composition comparison approach
might be unsure whether the essential nature of the job is such that a
business degree is necessary and might also be unsure whether the skills
required for the job might not be obtained with minimal training by the
employer. In the face of this uncertainty the court should classify the job as a
general skills one so that the defendant's work force is compared with the
general population. If the statistics show disparate impact, defendant is not
found to have discriminated, but rather is required to show the job related-
ness of the qualification standard, a business education, which he argues
was an essential requirement for the supervisory position.
Even if a court finds that a relevant labor market comparison is
appropriate, practical considerations will limit the information available to
the court and may cause it to compare defendant's work force with the group
of persons already employed in the type job at issue rather than with the
group of all persons who possess the requisite skills regardless of their
presehit employment. In Hazelwood, for example, the Court used census
data that reflected the racial composition of employed public school
teachers, presumably because information on the group of all persons
qualified to teach school was unavailable or too costly to obtain. 70 Informa-
tion on the racial, sexual, or ethnic characteristics of persons employed in a
particular type job can easily be gleaned from census data, union member-
In Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1975), the court allowed a general population comparison for the claim of sex discrimina-
tion in excluding a female still photographer from union membership. In Thompson v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 416 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1977),
however, the district court restricted the comparison gro'p for computer programmers to those
with minimal qualifications for the job.
The position in question here is not an entry-level job requiring no formal education,
but a highly skilled and technical job. Although plaintiff challenges the requirement of
a collegiate degree for the position, he does not challenge the common sense observa-
tion that an applicant for a programming trainee position must have some familiarity
with computer operations . ...
Id. at 980.
70. The Court's use of census figures reflecting the racial composition of the group of
actually employed teachers is arguably inconsistent with its statement that the "proper
comparison was between the racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial
composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor market."
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2742 (1977) (emphasis added).
Although the Court did not discuss the matter, it apparently accepted the census figures as a
sufficiently reliable estimate of the racial composition of the pool of qualified teachers.
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
HeinOnline -- 56 Tex. L. Rev.  16 1977-1978
Disparate Impact Analysis
ship rolls, records of professional organizations, and the like. 71 This infor-
mation is potentially inaccurate because it does not reflect the racial compo-
sition of the larger group of all persons qualified for a particular type job
who are seeking employment. In addition, census data may be unreliable
because it provides outdated information. Nevertheless, Hazelwood demon-
strates that information on the currently employed, provided it is not grossly
distorted, is an acceptable alternative to information on the group of qual-
ified persons and may be relied upon to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact.
Hazelwood provides an example of the complexity that imperfect
information introduces into relevant market analysis. Defendant school
district argued that the court of appeals erred by defining the relevant labor
market as both St. Louis County and the City of St. Louis, which is
surrounded by the county but not a part of it. 72 The 1970 Census showed
only 5.7 percent black representation among public school teachers in the
county, but 15.4 percent black representation in the combined city and
county area. Defendant argued that use of the 15.4 percent figure for
comparison with its less than 2 percent black teacher work force was
misleading because the City of St. Louis made special attempts to maintain a
50 percent black teacher staff.73 The effect of the city's policy arguably was
to inflate black representation among employed teachers in the city, which
was reflected in the census data, beyond their actual representation in the
unmeasured employment pool of qualified teachers. The Supreme Court
found this argument plausible and remanded the case with instructions that
the lower court consider this possibility when choosing the appropriate
comparative figure.74
The Court instructed the district court on remand to consider factors
that might affect the reliability of the county-plus-city figure. The proper
comparison, according to the Court, was "between the racial composition
of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified
public school teacher population in the relevant labor market." 75 The true
composition of the qualified public school teacher population from which
Hazelwood hires is unknown, and the problem lies in selecting the measure
that most closely approximates that population. The Court apparently ac-
71. See Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (union
membership rolls for composition of bricklayer group).
72. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 46.145 (Vernon 1966); see Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
97 S. Ct. 2736, 2740 n.8 (1977).
73. 97 S. Ct. at 2742-44.
74. Id. at 2743-44.
75. Id. at 2742 (emphasis added).
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cepted the use of census data reflecting actually employed teachers as an
estimate of the racial composition of the pool of qualified teachers, but it
directed the lower court to assess and to compensate for possible distortions
in that estimate. The Court instructed consideration of whether the St. Louis
City policy favoring fifty-percent black representation was in effect at the
time the 1970 census was taken and what change, if any, that policy might
have made in the racial composition of teachers in the city schools. 76 These
factors would be relevant to an assessment of the effect the city policy might
have had in inflating the percentage of black teachers employed by the city
and county systems beyond the real percentage of blacks in the qualified
public school teacher population. Because the relevant labor market ques-
tion addresses only the group of qualified teachers available for employment
by defendant Hazelwood school district, the Court also ordered con-
sideration of whether the St. Louis recruitment policy had attracted black
teachers to the city and diverted them from the pool of qualified persons
from which Hazelwood could hire.77 Conversely, the Court instructed the
district court to consider any evidence concerning the extent to which black
teachers in the city would prefer employment in Hazelwood or other subur-
ban districts. 78 Finally, the Court said that the experience of other school
districts in St. Louis County would be relevant to assess the validity of
excluding the city from the relevant labor market.79
Justice Stevens in dissent took issue with this fine tuning of the
statistics, maintaining that "[a]bsolute precision in the analysis of market
76. Id. at 2744. The census figures showing the racial composition of teachers actually
employed in the St. Louis area would be a poor estimate of the true composition of qualified
teachers if St. Louis City had deliberately chosen blacks from the pool as part of an affirmative
action plan. Use of the census figures as an estimate of the composition of the pool of qualified
teachers is valid only on the assumption that no factor influenced the employment of teachers
from the pool in a racial proportion that varied from that of the pool. An affirmative action plan,
or any form of racial preference, contradicts that assumption. See generally H. BLALOCK,
SOCIAL STATIsTics 509-30 (2d ed. 1972).
77. 97 S. Ct. at 2744.
78. Id.
79. Id. Although the Court did not expressly so state, these considerations were necessary
for an evaluation of whether the sample of employed teachers, about which the census figures
provided information, accurately reflected the larger group of all qualified teachers. If after
weighing these considerations the lower court found the census figures to be biased, it might
look to other figures such as county census data or derive some intermediate figure as a better
estimate of the racial composition of the unknown pool of all qualified teachers. See id. at 2743-
44.
Justice White, concurring, took the position that data concerning the applicant pool would
provide the best estimate of the racial composition of the group of teachers from which
Hazelwood could hire. "At least [the Government] might have been required to present some
defensible ground for believing that the racial composition of Hazelwood's applicant pool was
roughly the same as that for the school districts in the general area, before relying on compara-
tive work force data to establish its prima facie case." Id. at 2748.
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data is too much to expect." 8 He asserted that the relevant labor market
should certainly include the City of St. Louis because one-third of Hazel-
wood's current faculty came from the city. 81 Moreover, because the evi-
dence showed no absence of qualified black applicants in Hazelwood,
Stevens argued that the city's hiring policies should not affect the definition
of Hazelwood's relevant labor market.82
Many district court judges will concur in Justice Stevens' impatience
with the complexities of relevant labor market analysis. Hazelwood destroys
the apparent simplicity of the Teamsters standard, which was a comparison
of the composition of defendant's work force with that of the community in
which defendant hires. Although Hazelwood will require district courts to
use a sophisticated, almost scientific,8 3 approach to disparate impact analy-
sis, plaintiffs should not have the burden of defining the relevant labor
market. Plaintiff's prima facie case is established by the basic comparison of
defendant's work force with the general population. It should then be
defendant's task to rebut the inference of discrimination by showing that the
proper comparison is with a particular segment of the population.
B. Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Showing of Disparate Impact
HazeIwood underscored the idea that no method of demonstrating the
disparate impact of an employer's hiring practices is irrefutable. A court
must allow defendant to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case with statistical
evidence that tends to show that defendant's employment practices have had
no discriminatory impact.84 Defendant can, of course, attempt to rebut a
showing of disparate impact based on a general population comparison by
80. Id. at 2747.
81. Id. at 2746.
82. Id. These comments suggest that Justice Stevens perceived the issue to be the limits of
the relevant geographic community rather than the accuracy of census figures as an estimate of
the racial composition of the group of qualified teachers in that community.
As Justice Stevens' statements suggest, the geographic limits of the relevant labor market
are generally considered to be defined by the area from which employees are drawn. See Green
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1971). But see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 896-97 (despite employer's active recruitment policy
outside City of Santa Ana, city remained relevant geographic area for a work-force compari-
son), modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See generally Note,
supra note 14, at 467-74.
83. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2743 n.17 (1977) (discus-
sion of usefulness of statistical probability to assess the prima facie case). The Court concludes
its discussion of statistical probability with the following comment, however: "These observa-
tions are not intended to suggest that precise calculations of statistical significance are neces-
sary in employing statistical proof, but merely to highlight the importance of the choice of the
relevant labor market area." Id.
84. "[T]he employer must be given an opportunity to show 'that the claimed discriminatory
pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination.' " Id. at
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arguing that a relevant labor market comparison is the proper one. There
are, however, other possible methods of rebutting the inference of dis-
criminatory effect that arises upon plaintiff's showing of a disparity between
the racial composition of defendant's work force and the racial composition
of the appropriate comparative group.
1. Post-Act Hiring Statistics. -One method that defendant may use
to rebut the inference of discriminatory effect is to show more favorable
statistics concerning defendant's hiring after the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act. In the guard service example introduced earlier,85 for example,
plaintiff established disparate impact by showing that there was five-percent
black representation among the guards in defendant's company, but that the
general population in the areas where the company hired was twenty-percent
black. To rebut this prima facie case the company produced statistics
concerning recent hiring that showed a substantial number of new minority
employees. Assume that the company had overtly refused to hire blacks
prior to the Civil Rights Act, but that after the Act became effective twenty
percent of the new guards it hired were black. If there are 1000 guards in the
company and 250 were hired since passage of the Act, the fifty black guards
among the newly hired would constitute a five-percent black representation
in the company's overall work force. The company's task in this situation
• would be to convince the court that the overall work force data incorrectly
suggest that its present employment practices have a discriminatory impact.
It could logically argue that the mere five-percent black presence in the work
force reflects past discrimination that has been eradicated, and that the
twenty-percent black representation among new employees is more proba-
tive of whether defendant's present practices are discriminatory.
In Teamsters defendant attempted to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case
of disparate impact with post-Act hiring statistics in an argument along these
lines. The trucking company maintained that the racial imbalance was
caused solely by pre-Act discrimination which, although now abandoned,
still had a strong influence on the composition of its line driver work force.
86
The company contended that low turnover inhibited minority hiring for the
few years immediately following the 1965 effective date of the Act, but that
in recent years, especially after 1971, minority hiring had been strong. 87 The
2743. The Teamsters Court expressed similar concern: "We caution only that statistics are not
irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be
rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977).
85. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
86. 431 U.S. at 341.
87. Id.
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Supreme Court agreed with the company's statement of the principle, but
not with its analysis of the facts. Justice Stewart wrote for the Court: "The
argument would be a forceful one if this were an employer who, at the time
of suit, had done virtually no new hiring since the effective date of Title VII.
But it is not." 8 8 Stewart observed that although hiring was depressed in the
late sixties, the company had hired hundreds of line drivers nationally and
none was black. 89 Moreover, minority hiring by the company after 1971 did
not excuse the company's earlier violations of Title VII. 90
In Hazelwood defendant advanced this argument more successfully.
The school district had produced data that suggested at least the possibility
that post-Act hiring statistics could rebut the Government's prima facie
case,9' which was based on community composition comparison statistics.
The court of appeals had refused to consider this possibility, 92 so the Su-
preme Court instructed that on remand defendant must be allowed the
opportunity to rebut the Government's prima facie case with data about its
recent hiring. 93 Justice Stevens, dissenting, took exception to the remand on
the ground that the post-Act hiring data most favorable to defendant would
be insufficient to rebut the inference of discrimination created by plaintiff's
statistics. 94 His dissent was based on the facts of the case, however; he did
not disagree with the general principle that post-Act hiring data could be
used to rebut a prima facie case based on the community composition
comparison approach.
2. Applicant Flow Statistics.-In Dothard v. Rawlinson,95 decided
the same day as Hazelwood, the Supreme Court clarified the role of
applicant flow data in disparate impact analysis. Unlike Teamsters and
Hazelwood, Rawlinson was a private Title VII suit. Plaintiff, a female, was
88. Id.
89. Id. at 341 & n.21. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that "the
company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came not from a misuse of statistics
but from 'the inexorable zero."' Id. at 342 n.23.
90. Id. at 341-42.
91. Although defendant's work force remained less than two-percent black, 97 S. Ct. at
2739, of the new employees that defendant hired between 1972 and 1974, 3.7% were black, id.
at 2743.
Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 716(a), 78 Stat. 241. The 1972 Amendments to the Act, however, which extended coverage to
public employers, became effective March 24, 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 103. Thus, discrimination by defendant Hazelwood
School District prior to 1972 did not violate Title VII, and Hazelwood could logically rebut
plaintiff's prima facie case based on a work-force comparison with statistics showing only that
it had hired in a nondiscriminatory fashion since 1972.
92. 97 S. Ct. at 2742.
93. Id. at 2743-44.
94. Id. at 2745-46; see id. at 2744 (Brennan, J., concurring).
95. 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
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excluded from employment as an Alabama prison guard by statutory height
and weight provisions that required all guards to be five-feet-two inches in
height and one-hundred-twenty pounds in weight.9 6 She sued the State of
Alabama, alleging that it unlawfully discriminated against women in the
employment and assignment of its prison guards. The Supreme Court,
reaffirming the validity of the method of proof that looks to the effect of a
requirement on the population, held that plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of disparate impact by showing that the height and weight
requirements in combination excluded forty-one percent of the female popu-
lation, but less than one percent of the male population. 97
The Court rejected defendant's argument that in order to establish a
prima facie case plaintiff was required to produce applicant flow data, 98
which entails a comparison of the sexual or racial composition of the
applicant group with the sexual or racial composition of the group of persons
among the applicants that defendant elects to hire. The Court found that
because of the phenomenon of self-selection, applicant flow data would not
in all circumstances be probative of whether a requirement had a dis-
criminatory impact. "The applicant process might itself not adequately
reflect the actual potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people
might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability to
meet the very standards challenged as being discriminatory. 99 Presumably,
women who were aware of the height and weight requirements and who
failed to meet them would not bother to apply. Similarly, in a case like
Teamsters that was based on intentional discrimination, a general knowl-
edge of the absence of female or minority workers in a job would inhibit
applications. 100 Self-selection will cause the racial composition of the group
of applicants to reflect inaccurately the racial composition of the true
applicant pool, and evidence of the rates at which minority or female
applicants are hired will be an unreliable indicator of discrimination. 101
96. Id. at 2724. Although plaintiff apparently failed to meet only the weight requirement,
she challenged both the height and weight requirements, and the Court found both illegal. Id. at
2728.
97. Id. at 2727.
98. Id. But see id. at 2748-49 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977). See
also Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 380 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
101. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873,
(Chicanos discouraged by advertised height requirement), modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio
1973) (women discouraged by height and weight requirements learned of by telephone), aff'd in
part sub nom. Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976);
cf. Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975) (word-of-mouth solicitation); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974) (word-of-mouth recruitment), rev'd on
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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Although the Rawlinson Court held that plaintiff was not required to
produce applicant flow data to establish a prima facie case, it implied that
defendant was free to offer such data in rebuttal of plaintiff's case. 102 In
Hazelwood the Court clarified this implication by stating that if defendant
on remand could adduce applicant flow data, that evidence would be "very
relevant." 10 3 The problem of self-selection, however, logically makes ap-
plicant flow data a weak source of rebuttal evidence. Proof that the racial,
sexual, or ethnic composition of the actual applicants mirrors that of the
general population would be helpful, but not conclusive, to show that self-
selection was not taking place and would make applicant flow statistics
more reliable. 104 Only after it is shown that self-selection is not taking place
is applicant flow data reliable evidence of discrimination. 10 5
II. A Structural Analysis of Disparate Impact
The three recent Supreme Court cases discussing disparate impact
analysis, Teamsters, HazeIwood, and Rawlinson, have clarified signifi-
cantly the proper use of statistics to establish and to rebut plaintiff's prima
facie case, but those decisions do not provide a coherent scheme for the
analysis of disparate impact cases. The decisions establish a set of disjointed
precepts. Each precept stands fairly well alone, but they are not exhaustive,
nor is the relationship between them clear.
Five of the precepts derived from Teamsters, Hazelwood, and Rawlin-
son concern plaintiff's prima facie case. First, in a pattern or practice case in
which the Government alleges disparate treatment, statistics are probative of
purposeful discrimination." ° Second, in a case in which plaintiff alleges the
other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Local 53, Int'l Assoc. of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (union nepotism); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967) (black physicians knew futility of applying for
hospital staff membership); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969)
(priority to applicants with relatives and unannounced policy that application must be renewed
every two weeks known only if learned from friend or relative already employed), aff'd in part,
438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 445-54.
102. After explaining why plaintiff was not required to produce applicant flow data, the
Court stated that "[i]f the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the
plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S.
Ct. 2720, 2727 (1977).
103. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2742 n.13 (1977).
104. The Hazelwood Court was concerned that applicant flow data be "competent" and
"sufficiently reliable." Id. at 2742 n.13, 2744 n.21.
105. But cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (selection of appli-
cants along a "racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants" makes
out a prima facie case of discrimination); Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 (5th Cir.
1974) (applicant flow for blacks the "most direct route to proof").
106. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2741-42 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
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disparate impact of an employer's hiring requirements or practices, intent to
discriminate need not be shown. 107 Third, plaintiff can create an inference of
discrimination and thus establish a prima facie case by comparing the racial,
sexual, or ethnic composition of the employer's work force (or a single job
category) with that of the local population where defendant hires. 108 Fourth,
plaintiff is not required to produce applicant flow data; a prima facie case
can be established with general population statistics alone. 109 Last, plaintiff
may establish a prima facie case by showing the disparate impact of a single
employment requirement, such as a minimum height standard. 110
Three of the precepts concern defendant's rebuttal of plaintiff's prima
facie case. First, defendant may rebut plaintiff's case based on a general
population comparison by showing that a relevant labor market comparison
is appropriate. If the nature of the job is such that it demands skills not easily
acquired, Hazelwood instructs that the proper comparison for defendant's
work force is with the relevant labor market, which consists of the group of
persons who possess the requisite skills. 111 Second, defendant can rebut the
prima facie case with post-Act hiring statistics that show he is not currently
discriminating.11 2 Last, in at least some circumstances defendant can in-
troduce applicant flow data, which will be "very relevant" to the issue
whether he is discriminating. 113
These principles were sufficient to resolve the issues before the Court
in Teamsters, Hazelwood, and Rawlinson, and they serve as an important
reaffirmation of the Griggs concept of operationally defined discrimination.
They are, however, insufficient to resolve the analytical problems of more
complex cases such as the guard service example posed earlier. In that
example plaintiff established a prima facie case by comparing the five-
percent black representation in the company's work force with the twenty-
percent representation of blacks in the surrounding community. Defendant
107. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720,2726 (1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971)).
108. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2741 (1977) (quoting Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)). In using the term
"local population," lower courts have generally meant the demographic population and not the
labor force. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 873, 898,
modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
109. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1977). But see id. at 2748-49 (White, J.,
dissenting).
110. See id. at 2726; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
Ill. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2742 n.13 (1977). A corollary
is that defendant may rebut plaintiff's relevant labor market comparison by showing that
plaintiff's statistics do not accurately reflect the racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of the true
pool of qualified potential applicants. Id. at 2742-44.
112. Id. at 2742-43.
113. Id. at 2742 n.13.
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introduced in rebuttal of plaintiff's case evidence that twenty percent of its
recently hired employees were black, which compared favorably with the
racial composition of the general population. Assume that defendant's post-
Act hiring statistics succeed in dispelling the inference of discrimination
created by plaintiff's general population comparison. Can plaintiff still
establish a case by showing that an individual requirement, such as the
written test, is failed by blacks at a disproportionately higher rate? The facts
of this hypothetical as originally presented were that defendant guard service
company had three employment requirements: military or guard work ex-
perience, a written test, and a subjective and standardless interview. Blacks
failed the written test much more frequently than did whites, but the
experience requirement favored blacks because of their disproportionately
high representation among veterans. As a result, the overall employment
process in recent years selected blacks at a rate close to their representation
in the general population. The eight precepts derived from Teamsters,
Hazelwood, and Rawlinson leave unanswered whether defendant must
prove the job relatedness of the test even though he rebutted the inference of
discrimination based on the general population comparison.
In the absence of an ordered framework for disparate impact analysis,
trial courts will continue to be troubled by the difficult issues that inhere in
complex cases. The next part of this article discusses the particular issue
whether plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing the disparate
impact of a single requirement even though the overall employment process
selects members of a protected group at a rate consistent with their represen-
tation in the population. The lack of consensus on this issue underscores the
need for a clear analytical framework for disparate impact questions. The
following part of the article proposes such a framework.
A. Single Requirement Impact Versus Overall Hiring Impact
A 1975 police employment case, Smith v. Troyan,114 presented to the
Sixth Circuit the problem of single requirement impact in the absence of
overall hiring impact. The facts were very similar to those of the guard
service example discussed earlier. Plaintiffs brought a private class action in
which they alleged racial discrimination in the hiring of police officers for
the City of East Cleveland, Ohio. The employment selection process
contained several steps. One was the Army General Classification Test
114. Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934
(1976).
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(AGCT), which whites passed at a rate significantly greater than blacks. 115
Another aspect of the selection process, however, was a statutory provision
for a veterans preference, which favored blacks because of their dispropor-
tionately high representation among veterans. 116 These requirements taken
together cancelled out the impact of either requirement taken alone. 117 As a
result, although plaintiffs could show the discriminatory effect of the
AGCT, they could not prove that the overall employment selection process
had a disparate impact.
The district court in Smith held that the evidence showing the dispro-
portionately high failing rate among blacks on the AGCT sufficed to estab-
lish plaintiff's prima facie case.1 8 Moreover, the lack of any disparate
impact in the overall hiring process did not dispel the inference of discrimi-
nation created by the effect of the AGCT.1 19 The district court reasoned that
the cancelling effect of the veterans preference did not rebut plaintiff's case
because military experience was admittedly job related to the position of
police officer. Because of the job-related experience factor, which favored
blacks, black applicants were better qualified on the whole than white
applicants. The job validity of the AGCT, however, was still at issue. The
district court explained: "The fact that some blacks were better qualified in
one aspect does not justify defendants in unfairly penalizing blacks on the
examination if it is not also job related."' 120
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, favored a "bottom line" ap-
proach, which would look only to the disparate impact of the whole employ-
ment selection process. 121 The court conceived of the problem as one of
"tests" and "subtests" and expressed concern that an examination of
115. The district court noted the following "pass" rates (scores over 100) on the AGCT the
previous three times it was given:
blacks (%) whites (%)
1969 15 41
1970 9 63
1973 22 71
Id. at 1145.
116. Seventy-five percent of the black applicants were veterans, but only thirty-six percent
of the white applicants were. Id. at 1146.
117. Although in 1973 defendant's police officer work force was only 12% black and the
local population was 60% black, defendant relied on applicant flow data to show that, since
1968, 33% of its new employees had been black, which compared favorably with the 33%-43%
representation of blacks in defendant's applicant pool. Id.
118. Id. at 1145-47.
119. Id. at 1146.
120. Id.
121. Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492,497-98 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
The Sixth Circuit did not dispute the disparate impact of the AGCT, but it held plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case with proof of the disparate impact of the examination in the
absence of proof that the overall hiring process had a disparate impact. Id.
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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individual requirements would subject minute parts of an employment
procedure to judicial scrutiny. 122 The court's reasoning contrasts starkly
with that of the district court:
That blacks fare less well than whites on the AGCT, a "subtest"
in the process of hiring East Cleveland police officers, is insuffi-
cient in itself to require defendants to justify the AGCT as being
job-related. Carried to its logical extreme, such a criterion would
require the elimination of individual questions marked by poorer
performance by a racial group, on the ground that such a question
was a "subtest" of the "subtest. 1 23
The Supreme Court has not yet had to decide the issue posed by
Smith,24 although Justice White's separate opinion in Hazelwood and
Rawlinson might be interpreted as an adoption of the Sixth Circuit's bottom
line approach. Concurring in Hazelwood and dissenting in Rawlinson,
White emphasized the importance of applicant flow data to establish a prima
facie case of discriminatory effect. He approved the Hazelwood remand,
which ordered the lower court to allow defendant to present post-Act hiring
statistics in rebuttal of plaintiff's case, but he expressed reservations that the
Court had not properly emphasized the importance of applicant flow data.125
Similarly, he rejected in Rawlinson the majority's approach to proof that the
height and weight requirements had a discriminatory effect against wom-
en. 126 Noting that plaintiff did not offer applicant flow data, White stated
that he was "unwilling to believe that the percentage of women applying or
interested in applying for jobs as prison guards in Alabama approximates the
percentage of women either in the national or state population." 127 Accord-
ingly, his position was that a prima facie case could not be established with a
simple showing of the effect of the height and weight requirements on the
general population.
Justice White's position, however, is not identical to the Sixth Circuit's
bottom line approach. In Smith, the circuit court was concerned about
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977), Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1977), establish that plaintiff can make
out a prima facie case with a showing that a single selection requirement has a disparate impact,
but those cases do not decide the issue presented by Smith because in each it appeared that the
overall hiring process had a disparate impact.
125. The Court's opinion of course permits Hazelwood to introduce applicant pool data
on remand in order to rebut the prima facie case of a discriminatory pattern or
practice. This may be the only fair and realistic allocation of the evidence burden, but
arguably the United States should have been required to adduce evidence as to the
applicant pool before it was entitled to its prima facie presumption.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2748 (1977).
126. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2748-49 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2749.
HeinOnline -- 56 Tex. L. Rev.  27 1977-1978
Texas Law Review Vol. 56: 1, 1977
judicial preoccupation with subtests that were mere components of the total
hiring process. Justice White's concern in Rawlinson was with the validity
of the assumption that the height and weight requirements excluded women
who would want to be prison guards when there was no showing that short
women would apply for the job in proportion to their representation in the
population. His focus on applicant flow data thus reflected his uncertainty
that the relevant group of women were included in the comparison group
and not that bottom line analysis is necessarily preferable.
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue of single
requirement impact in the absence of overall hiring impact has been exacer-
bated by the absence, until recently, of any administrative standards on the
issue. Indeed, the EEOC Guidelines have contained neither a general defini-
tion of discrimination nor a methodology for disparate impact analysis.128
Following the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, however, Congress
created a council of federal agencies with the mandate to draft new
guidelines for use in the uniform enforcement of all federal acts and orders
concerning employment discrimination. 2 9 The resulting guidelines, now
the Federal Executive Agency Guidelines on Employee Selection (Agency
Guidelines), 130 have been endorsed by the Department of Labor, the Civil
Service Commission, and the Department of Justice. 131 The EEOC, which
was represented on the drafting committee, has declined to accept the new
guidelines and maintains a preference for its own EEOC Guidelines. 132
The new Agency Guidelines contain a section on disparate impact
analysis 133 that is lacking in their EEOC counterpart. That section incorpo-
128. The guidelines consider disparate impact only in the context of testing. They provide
that the use of an unvalidated test that "adversely affects" the equal employment opportunities
of groups protected by Title VII constitutes discrimination, but the term "adversely affects" is
undefined. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1976).
129. The council, called the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, was
created to promote efficiency and to "eliminate conflict, competition, duplication and inconsis-
tency" among the various parts of the federal government responsible for enforcing equal
employment opportunity laws and orders. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14
(Supp. V 1975).
130. Federal Executive Agency Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-3.1 to .14 (1977).
131. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,744 (1976).
132. Shortly before the Agency Guidelines were published in December 1976, the EEOC
republished its own guidelines with an introductory note that the EEOC Guidelines remained
applicable to all parties subject to the jurisdiction of the EEOC under Title VII. 41 Fed. Reg.
51,984 (1976).
Most recently, however, another set of proposed uniform guidelines has been drafted and
published for comment. These newest guidelines, the Proposed Uniform Employee Selection
Guidelines, have been agreed upon tenatatively by all four of the agencies, including the EEOC.
42 Fed. Reg. 65,542, - (1977) (corrected in 43 Fed. Reg. 1506 (1978)). If these proposed
guidelines are adopted, they will supersede all previous guidelines issued by the agencies. Id. at
133. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4 (1977). This section has been incorporated into the Proposed
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rates a bottom line approach similar to that of the Sixth Circuit and tests
disparate impact by a comparison of applicant acceptance rates. The
guidelines advise employers to maintain information showing the effect of
the employer's selection procedures on groups defined by race, sex, and
ethnicity. 134 From that information applicant flow figures are extracted for
each group. To test for disparate impact the acceptance rate of a particular
group is compared with the acceptance rate of the group whose members are
hired most frequently (typically white males). 13 If this comparison reveals
disparate impact in the overall hiring process, 136 the employer must examine
each selection requirement for disparate impact and validate every require-
ment that disproportionately excludes members of a particular group. 137 If,
however, the overall selection process does not have disparate impact, the
exclusionary effect of individual requirements need not be examined. 138
An initial problem with the Agency Guidelines is that Rawlinson casts
doubt on the reliability of the method that the guidelines adopt for proving
disparate impact. The guidelines require a comparison of selection rates of
groups of applicants. A finding of disparate impact results when the selec-
tion rate of a particular group is less than four-fifths of the selection rate of
the group hired most frequently. 139 Rawlinson, however, expressly held that
a finding of disparate impact need not be based on data concerning actual
applicants. 140 Justice Stewart explained that recognition by members of the
population of their inability to meet announced standards would inhibit
applications and distort the representative character of the applicant pool. ' 4'
Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,542 (1977) (corrected in 43 Fed. Reg.
1506 (1978)). All comments in this article concerning the adverse impact provisions of the
Agency Guidelines are equally applicable to the adverse impact provisions of the proposed
uniform guidelines.
134. Id. § 60-3.4(a).
135. Id. § 60-3.4(b).
136. The guidelines define disparate impact, called "adverse impact," as a selection rate for
any racial, sexual, or ethnic group that is less than four-fifths the rate for the group with the
highest selection rate. Id. This rule, which inadvisably fails to distinguish between large and
small groups, is softened somewhat by an exception for differences based on small numbers if
the differences are not statistically significant. Id. A rule based entirely on statistical signifi-
cance would be as workable as this four-fifths rule and would not require exception. See
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, n.17 (1977) (approving Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977)) (use of statistically significant differences based upon the binomial
distribution).
137. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(b) (1977). The four-fifths rule for evaluating overall disparate
impact, see note 136 supra, applies also to the testing of individual requirements for disparate
impact. d.
138. Id.
139. Id. See note 136 supra.
140. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1977). But see id. at 2748-49 (White, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id. at 2727.
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Although Rawlinson does not invalidate the Agency Guidelines, 142 the
observation by the Supreme Court that applicant flow data is an inherently
unreliable measure of disparate impact suggests the need to reconsider
whether the guidelines should contain alternative methods for proof of
disparate impact.
A second problem is that under the Agency Guidelines disparate impact
is determined on the basis of the results of the overall selection process
without regard to the effect of particular selection requirements. This is the
bottom line approach of the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Troyan. 143 The
justification offered for this approach by the Department of Justice is the
limitation on federal enforcement resources. According to the Deputy Attor-
ney General, when an overall selection process results in "equal employ-
ment opportunity" for all applicants, expenditure of limited federal re-
sources to examine the component parts of the hiring process is inappro-
priate. 144 Despite this practical justification, basing the disparate impact
inquiry only on the results of the overall selection process will in some
circumstances deprive qualified women and minorities of equal employment
opportunity. The district court's analysis in Smith145 is persuasive. In that
case, the admittedly valid military experience preference favored blacks,
and thus a disproportionately high number of blacks were qualified for the
job. The unvalidated written test, which blacks failed disporportionately,
penalized many otherwise qualified black applicants. Defendant's work
force compared favorably with black representation in the general popula-
tion but as long as the written test was not shown to be job related, blacks
were underrepresented in the work force as compared with their representa-
tion in the group of qualified persons. Equal opportunity, according to the
district court, meant more than hiring an acceptable number of minority
applicants overall. 146
142. Rawlinson did not find applicant flow data inadmissable. On the contrary, the Court
held only that plaintiff was not'required to produce applicant flow data for a prima facie case,
and elsewhere it stated that if defendant could adduce such evidence in rebuttal it would be
"very relevant," Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2742 n.13 (1977).
Moreover, Rawlinson was a private suit, and the Court did not consider factors such as limited
federal resources that might affect administrative enforcement of the federal equal employment
opportunity laws.
143. 520 F.2d 492, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
144. Department of Justice, Questions and Answers on the Federal Executive Agency
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 3821 (1977).
145. Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1145-47 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 934 (1976).
146. But see Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974). In Butts the court held
that an Iowa statute forbidding employment of felons in civil service jobs did not violate the
equal protection clause. To show the discriminatory impact of the statute on blacks, plaintiff
introduced evidence that a disporportionate number of inmates in Iowa prisons are black. The
Vol. 56: 1, 1977
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The Department of Justice cautions that the focus of the guidelines on
the overall selection process rather than on its component parts does not
mean that discrimination in one selection requirement can be balanced by
another discriminatory requirement. 147 Presumably, the Department's asser-
tion that the guidelines "do not permit any kind of discrimination" 148 means
that it will not tolerate overt discrimination to achieve quotas. Despite this
disclaimer, the guidelines do encourage employers to create an employment
process that makes the numbers "work out right" because an acceptable
overall selection rate, even in the presence of requirements that favor
different groups, will foreclose under the guidelines an inquiry into the
validity of individual requirements. The limitation on the selection of
counterbalancing requirements is that the employer not intentionally or
overtly discriminate either for or against any group, but in practice this
limitation can probably be overcome by selection of requirements that
appear plausibly job related.
The Agency Guidelines thus create an incentive for employers to
devise surreptitious quota systems composed of counterbalancing selection
requirements that have sufficient appearance of job relatedness to prevent a
charge of intentional discrimination. 4 9 For example, subjective interviews
by a personnel manager might have the necessary impact for or against a
particular group to make the overall selection rates come out right, yet
provide no evidence of overt discrimination. A minimum or maximum
height requirement, if plausibly job related, might survive the guidelines
despite Rawlinson and despite the lack of a validity study, as long as the
requirement was buried among the other requirements making up the total
district court found this evidence inconclusive, especially in light of evidence that blacks held
7.1% of the civil service jobs in Des Moines while blacks constitute 5.6% of the city population
and 1.2% of the state population.
147. Department of Justice, Questions and Answers on the Federal Executive Agency
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 3821 (1977).
148. Id.
149. The Fifth Circuit has recognized the dangers of an approach that looks only to overall
hiring impact. In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), the
court addressed the issue of counterbalancing requirements as follows:
Goodyear directs our attention to many statistics which it asserts establish that it has
transferred black employees from the labor d~partment and hired blacks from the
Houston area in a ratio equivalent to the total black population in the area. However,
reliance on such data misinterprets the significance of Johnson's proof. Such evidence
does not disprove the essential finding that the tests have a detrimental impact on
black applicants. It merely discloses that Goodyear has attempted by other practices
to remove the taint of the tests' consequences. The fact still remains that for those
potential black hirees and black labor department transferors, these unvalidated test-
ing devices have a substantial invidious effect.
rd. at 1372-73.
In his concurring opinion in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), Justice
Blackmun expressed concern that strict adherence to the test validation requirements of the
EEOC Guidelines would encourage quota systems: "I fear that a too-rigid application of the
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selection process. A stringent eyesight test without corrective lenses might
pass as a reasonable measure without a validation study even though it
disproportionately excluded white applicants. 150 An education requirement
consisting of minimum or maximum 151 years of schooling might similarly
be used to eliminate otherwise qualified black applicants, despite Griggs, as
long as the bottom line acceptance rate worked out right. The key under the
guidelines is the achievement of an acceptable overall result based upon a
conglomeration of plausible, but unvalidated, requirements. The unofficial
quota approach to hiring encouraged by the guidelines may relieve person-
nel managers of some of the burdens of complying with equal employment
opportunity requirements, but it flies in the face of the concept of removing
artificial barriers to equal opportunity. Greater certainty for employers with
respect to their duty to provide equal employment opportunity can be
achieved without the perils created by the overall selection approach of the
Agency Guidelines. The following part of this article builds upon the
principles of Teamsters, Hazelwood, and Rawlinson to suggest a coherent,
ordered framework for disparate impact analysis that dispenses with the
bottom line approach.
B. A Structural Proposal for Disparate Impact Analysis
The following scheme is proposed as a means of formalizing a structure
of disparate impact principles. The purpose of this proposed method of
uniform analysis is not only to clarify the contributions of the recent
Supreme Court decisions but also to suggest the logical extension of the
principles of those decisions to situations not yet presented to the Court.
This structure is designed to avoid the pitfalls present in the approach of the
Agency Guidelines to disparate impact analysis.
At the outset, disparate impact analysis requires distinctions concern-
ing the type of selection process used by the employer and the nature of the
EEOC Guidelines will leave the employer little choice, save an impossibly expensive and
complex validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system of employment selection.
This, of course, is far from the intent of Title VII." Id. at 449. Ironically, although the Agency
Guidelines have lessened the difficulty of test validation, they also encourage the subjective
quota system that Justice Blackmun feared because of their bottom line approach to disparate
impact analysis.
150. Differences in visual acuity attributable to race may cause an eyesight requirement to
have a disparate impact. One study has concluded that such differences exist:
Negro adults, both men and women, were found to have better uncorrected visual
acuity at both distance and near than white adults-that is, relatively more reached the
equivalent of 20/30 or better and fewer did not exceed the equivalent of 20/100. Racial
differences at the level of 20/20 or better. . . however, were negligible.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, BINOCULAR VISUAL ACUITY OF ADULTS 1960-62, at
15 (1967).
151. An employer might require a maximum number of years of education, the reverse of
the Griggs diploma requirement, on the ground that morale is poor among employees who are
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job in question. First, the selection process is classified as one of three
types: (1) a collection of specific requirements; (2) a subjective, nonspecific
hiring process; or (3) a process composed of specific and nonspecific parts,
such as a test plus a subjective interview. The second distinction turns on the
nature of the job in question. Jobs requiring skills that can be attained by
most people after minimal instruction or experience are distinguished from
jobs that can be performed only by persons with special qualifications.
Application of these two distinctions to the particular job and employment
process in question allows a court to characterize a disparate impact case as
one of six analytically distinct types.
1. Case I Specific Requirements Employment Process and Readily
Acquired Skills .- In this type of disparate impact case the nature of the job
is such that it requires skills commonly possessed or easily attained by many
people. Police officers, fire fighters, many factory workers, and bank tellers
have jobs of this type. The employer's selection process consists of one or
more specific requirements such as height or weight standards, a physical
agility test, a written test, a diploma requirement, or lack of an arrest record.
Plaintiff should be able to establish a prima facie case with evidence
that one or more of these requirements has the effect of excluding a
disproportionate number of potential applicants from the general population
on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity. The effect of each selection require-
ment should be considered without regard to the effect of any other require-
ment. The kind of evidence that plaintiff needs to show the disparate impact
of a particular requirement is statistical proof probative of the following
question: If this test or standard were to be given to every person who might
ever apply for this job, would it have the effect of disqualifying dispropor-
tionately members of a given racial, sexual, or ethnic group? Evidence
probative of this question includes statistics concerning the effect of the
requirement on the general population or, if this is unavailable, statistics
showing a significant difference in the pass-fail rates of groups of actual
applicants. 152 If defendant fails to refute the validity of plaintiff's statistics
showing disparate impact, defendant has the burden of proving the require-
ment is job related.
Rawlinson was a disparate impact case of this type. The selection
requirements at issue, height and weight standards, were specific, and the
over-educated for a particular job. Normally, an employer would need to validate such a
requirement if it had a racial impact. Under the bottom line analysis of the Agency Guidelines,
however, an employer could counterbalance another requirement to avoid the burden of
validation. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4 (1977).
152. See Shoben, supra note 28.
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job of prison guard did not require specialized skills. Plaintiff's statistics
showed that both selection requirements would exclude more adult women
than adult men. 153 The Court did not ignore the geographic issue concerning
who might apply to be an Alabama prison guard. It justified the use of
national height and weight figures on the ground that there was no reason to
believe that the height and weight of Alabama men and women differed
markedly from that of the national population. 154
2. Case I: Specific Requirements Employment Process and Special
Qualifications.-The second type of disparate impact case concerns jobs
that require specialized skills like those held by school teachers, account-
ants, lawyers, and medical doctors. The selection process is composed of
specific job requirements such as tests, recent graduation requirements,
intracompany experience, and grade point average cut-offs.
The analysis for disparate impact is similar to that for the first type case
except that a particular requirement must be examined for its effect on
racial, sexual, or ethnic groups among only those people who possess the
necessary special qualifications. If, for example, an employer uses a test to
select teachers, then the effect of that test on groups defined by race, sex, or
ethnicity is relevant only among the group of persons who are qualified by
education to be teachers.
3. Case HI: Subjective Employment Process and Readily Acquired
Skills.-In the third type case there is a subjective hiring process, such as an
unstructured and standardless interview, for a position that requires skills
commonly held or easily acquired by many people. For example, an em-
ployer might conduct simple interviews to select an assembly line worker, a
filing clerk, or a truck driver.
Plaintiff should establish a prima facie case by comparing the racial,
sexual, or ethnic composition of defendant's work force with that of the
general population in the geographic area where defendant hires. If plaintiff
is challenging only one job category among many in defendant's work
force, he should compare the composition of employees in that category
with the general population. Teamsters is an example of the latter type case.
Although defendant's work force included many categories of truck drivers,
plaintiff alleged discrimination only in the employment of long-haul driv-
ers. 155 The Supreme Court thus compared the racial composition of the
153. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1977). See text accompanying notes 24-25
supra.
154. Id.
155. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329 & n.3 (1977).
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group of long haul drivers with the composition of the general population in
the communities where those drivers were hired. 156
The question to be answered by the community composition compari-
son approach should be presented in terms of probability theory: Given the
racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of the community in which defendant
hires, what is the probability that his work force would attain its particular
composition in the absence of a discriminatory effect in defendant's selec-
tion process? If the probability is low that a work force with the composition
of defendant's would result without a discriminatory influence, then an
inference of disproportionate exclusion arises. Defendant employer may
then attempt to rebut this inference with evidence of nondiscriminatory post-
Act hiring or perhaps with applicant flow data.
4. Case IV Subjective Employment Process and Special Qualifica-
tions.-The fourth problem is the same as the third except that the job
requires specialized skills. Hazelwood is an example of this type of case.
The job of teaching historically and by state licensing standards requires a
college education, and defendant Hazelwood School District had no clear
standards for selecting among the group of qualified applicants. 5 7 The
analysis for this type case is similar to that for the third with the exception
that the relevant labor market is composed only of those persons in the
community where defendant hires who possess the requisite qualifications.
As applied to the facts of Hazelwood, the key analytical question is as
follows: If the group of persons qualified to be school teachers in the area
where defendant hires is ten-percent black, what is the probability that the
school district would have hired'less than two-percent black teachers absent
a discriminatory effect in its selection process? If the probability is low, then
plaintiff has created an inference of discrimination and defendant has the
burden to dispel that inference. Again, defendant may rebut the prima facie
case with favorable post-Act hiring data and perhaps with application flow
data.
5. Cases V and V1: Combination of Specific and Subjective Employ-
ment Process and Skills Either Readily Acquired or Specialized.-In the
final two types of cases, the employment process combines specific and
subjective requirements for either a readily acquired skills job or a
specialized skills job. The private guard service example posited earlier fits
the first of these two categories because the guard job was probably easily
156. Id. at 339 n.20.
157. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2739 (1977) ("each school
principal possessed virtually unlimited discretion in hiring teachers for his school").
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learned, and the employment process included two specific requirements, a
test and an experience requirement, as well as a subjective and standardless
interview. Cases that fall within these two categories should be analyzed
initially the same as the first two types of cases, which concern only specific
requirements. Plaintiff should be able to establish a prima facie case that a
particular requirement has a discriminatory effect either by showing the
effect of the requirement on the general population or relevant labor market
or by showing the pass-fail rates of actual applicants. 158 Because of the
subjective interview component, however, these two types of cases can also
be analyzed the same way that the third and fourth types of cases are
analyzed. Plaintiff should have the alternative of establishing a prima facie
case by showing that the racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of the
employer's work force compares unfavorably with the composition of the
relevant labor market or general population in the communities where the
employer hires.
If plaintiff shows that a specific requirement has a disparate impact,
defendant will have the burden of validating the use of that requirement just
as he would under the first and second types of cases. If, however, the
comparison of the racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of defendant's work
force with that of the relevant labor market creates a statistically significant
probability of discriminatory effect, defendant's opportunity to rebut should
be limited to applicant flow data derived only from the steps in the employ-
ment process immediately before and after the subjective component; the
data should reflect only the effect of that component. 159 To allow an
employer to rebut with general applicant flow data or post-Act hiring data
that would show the effect of the overall employment process, as he would
be able to do in the third and fourth type cases, would be to encourage the
use of this subjective component as a balancing factor to maintain a quota
hiring system. The use of requirements for the preferential hiring of any
group is antithetical to the concept of equal employment opportunity based
on merit. As the Supreme Court asserted in Griggs, "[d]iscriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
Congress has proscribed." 160
158. In Harless v. Duck, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1616 (N.D. Ohio 1977), the employment
process for the hiring of police officers comprised a written examination, an agility test, and a
subjective oral interview. The court examined each component separately for disparate impact.
159. If, for example, the employment process consisted of a validated education require-
ment plus an interview, the disparate impact of the interview should not be subject to rebuttal
by proof of favorable applicant flow data for the overall hiring process. The relevant question
would be the effect of the interview on those individuals who have already satisfied the
validated education requirement. But see Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (validated veterans preference that favored blacks and unvalidated
test that disfavored blacks).
160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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I. Disparate Impact Analysis and Preferential Hiring Questions
The validation by the Court in Teamsters and Hazelwood of the
community composition comparison approach to proof of Title VII viola-
tions was based on the rationale that nondiscriminatory employment prac-
tices will produce over time a work force that reflects the composition of the
community or other relevant labor market. 161 Does this approach indirectly
require preferential hiring to achieve quotas, which is incompatible with the
principle of employment on merit?
This question of the compatibility of disparate impact analysis with
nonpreferential hiring was presented to the Court in Teamsters, but not
resolved. Defendants argued that a court should not give disparate impact
analysis decisive weight in a Title VII case because to do so would conflict
with section 703(j) of the Act concerning preferential treatment. That
section provides that an employer shall not be required to grant preferential
treatment to any group on account of imbalance in his work force among
racial, sexual, or ethnic groups.162 In Teamsters defendants maintained that
this statutory guarantee was violated by the use of disparate impact analysis,
at least when that analysis entailed a comparison of the proportion of
minorities in the employer's work force with their representation in the
population. 163 The Court did not decide whether the use of disparate impact
analysis conflicted with section 703(j) because the Government had alleged
and proved purposeful discrimination. The Government compared the em-
ployer's work force with that of the community to bolster its evidence of
intentional discrimination and not to support what Justice Stewart called "an
erroneous theory that Title VII requires an employer's work force to be
racially balanced." 164
Because the Government in Teamsters proved purposeful discrimina-
tion the Court also did not decide the related issue whether plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case under Title VII with statistics alone. Individual
witnesses in Teamsters testified to forty specific instances of discrimina-
161. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2741 (1977) (quoting Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)).
162. Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by an employer
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 7036), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1970).
163. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n:20 (1977).
164. Id. The Hazelwood Court did not address this issue.
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tion, and the district court judge used this testimony as the basis for his
finding that defendant had ignored numerous qualified minority applicants
for the line driver jobs in favor of white applicants. 165 Justice Stewart
explained that the evidence of individual discrimination "bolstered" the
statistical evidence of disparate impact and "brought the cold numbers
convincingly to life." ' 166 Proof of intentional discrimination is always a
desirable litigation strategy, 167 but Justice Stewart's ambiguous language in
Teamsters leaves open the possibility that the Court will require future
plaintiffs to complement their disparate impact statistics with evidence of
specific instances of discrimination. 1 68 Thus, because Teamsters concerned
purposeful discrimination two significant questions remain unresolved.
First, can plaintiff establish a prima facie case under Griggs with evidence
only of disparate impact? If so, is this approach contrary to section 703(j),
which guarantees that the Act does not require preferential hiring?
A. Preferential Hiring: Disparate Impact and Section 703(j)
The nature of disparate impact analysis as originally set forth in
Griggs, and as developed in Teamsters, Hazelwood, and Rawlinson, is
consistent with the idea of employment based only on merit and thus should
not be considered in conflict with section 703(j). The reason for this is that
the effect of disparate impact analysis is only to create an inference of
disproportionate exclusion that the employer must rebut and is not to require
that the employer's work force mirror the community.
The community composition comparison approach approved in Team-
sters and Hazelwood addresses the following statistical question: Given the
racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of the community labor pool from
which defendant hires, what is the probability that his work force would
have its particular composition if no factor other than chance had affected
165. Id. at 338.
166. Id. at 338, 339.
167. See generally A. RUZICHO, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, AN INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION
& TRIAL MANUAL (1976).
168. In Hazelwood defendants challenged "the judgment of the Court of Appeals for its
reliance on 'undifferentiated work force statistics to find an unrebutted prima facie case of
employment discrimination."' Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2741
(1977). The Court characterized the issue as whether the statistics were sufficiently probative to
support a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination. Id. It concluded that "[w]here gross
statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof
of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Id. Despite this broad statement, Hazelwood, like
Teamsters, did not decide the question whether a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory effect with statistics alone. First, Hazelwood was a disparate treatment rather
than a disparate impact case. Id. at 2741 n.12. Second, because the Government produced
evidence of 55 instances of overt discrimination, id. at 2739, the statistical work force compari-
son was only one component of its prima facie case of disparate treatment.
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the hiring process? 169 This approach to proof of disparate impact is based on
the assumption that among people in the relevant labor market merit is
equally distributed across groups, so that the race, sex, or ethnicity of each
employee hired on the basis of merit will depend only on chance. If the
probability of defendant's labor force having its composition by chance
alone is very small, there arises an inference that some other factor, such as
discrimination, has affected the selection. The burden then shifts to defend-
ant to validate his employment practices. By showing that his selection
requirements are job related, defendant demonstrates that differences in
merit among groups is the factor that is influencing the composition of his
work force. Because defendant refutes the original assumption behind the
work force comparison-equal distribution of merit across groups-he also
dispels the inference of unlawful discrimination. On the other hand, if
defendant cannot disprove the validity of the inference of discrimination by
showing that his selection requirements are job related, then, under Griggs,
he is in violation of the Act.
Nothing in this process should be construed to require or even to
encourage preferential hiring. An employer's work force is not expected to
mirror the composition of the local population or relevant labor market. On
the contrary, one would not expect a nondiscriminating employer's work
force to mirror constantly and exactly the composition of the community, 170
just as one does not expect when playing cards that a fairly dealt bridge hand
will always result in a balanced distribution of the honors. The issue is the
fairness of the procedure that produces the result. The method of probing the
fairness of an employment process is disparate impact analysis, which
concerns the probability of obtaining a particular result if the selection
procedure has been nondiscriminatory. The process is similar to the way one
would investigate the fairness of the card dealing if one team consistently
received very few honor cards. After many deals the team without the
honors would want to know the probability of this consistently low-honor
result. If the probability is low, such as one chance in a hundred, 171 that the
169. See id. at 2743 n.17; Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977).
170. See F. MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE & G. THOMAS, PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLICA-
TIONS 7-16 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as MOSTELLER et al.].
This principle was observed in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 432 F.2d 875
(5th Cir. 1970). Carter concerned the racial distribution of teacher assignments after the
implementation of a school desegregation order. The court observed: "[O]nce a unitary system
has been established the system-wide racial ratio may thereafter change from time to time as a
result of non-discriminatory application of objective merit standards in the selection and
composition of faculty and staff." Id. at 878-79.
171. See MOSTELLER et al., supra note 170, at 305-11.
The EEOC Guidelines discuss statistical significance in the context of test validation, but
not in the context of the required showing of disparate impact for plaintiff's prima facie case.
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evening's bad hands were only the result of bad luck, then an observer might
infer unfair dealing. The dealers should then be required to show the deck
and to demonstrate the fairness of the dealing procedure. It would be
contrary to the principles of the game, however, to suggest that the method
of probing the fairness of the dealing is a requirement that the honors must
be equally distributed to the teams, because fair and blind dealing will result
in some variations in the luck of the teams from evening to evening. In the
same manner, it is contrary to the principles of equal employment opportu-
nity to suggest that the method of probing the fairness of a hiring process is a
requirement that the selection must be done in a preferential manner.
Disparate impact analysis is therefore only a method of proof based on
statistical probability that places the burden on defendant to validate his
selection requirements. Its use should not be considered a violation of the
Act's guarantee that it does not require preferential hiring.172
B. The Prima Facie Case with Statistics Alone
This argument that the use of disparate impact analysis is consistent
with nonpreferential hiring does not determine the related question whether
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case in a class action under Title VII
using only statistics. Although the Supreme Court has not yet expressly
answered that question, it follows from Griggs that the presentation of
statistics showing disparate impact should be sufficient by itself to create an
inference of discrimination and to establish a prima facie case. Griggs
compels this conclusion for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court stated in
Griggs the principle that discrimination goes to the consequences of em-
For test validation, the guidelines use a level of significance p < .05 (one chance in 20 that the
result occurred by chance alone). 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c) (1976). At least one district court case
has adopted this level of significance for disparate impact analysis, Harless v. Duck, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1616, 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1977), but the Supreme Court's discussion of statistical
analysis for the prima facie case does not specify a particular level of significance as required.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2743 n.17 (1977).
The Agency Guidelines generally rely upon a four-fifths rule. See note 136 supra. In cases
of small numbers the guidelines create an exception to the four-fifths rule for statistical
significance, but they do not indicate what level of probability is.significant. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
3.4(b) (1977). In Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 670 (N.D. Ala.
1977), the court applied the FEA Guidelines, but the probabilities were so low (p < .001) that
the requisite significance level was not an issue. Id. at 673-74.
172. But see Harper v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D.C. Md.
1973).
[A]cceptance of the idea that discrepancies between racial composition of the commu-
nity and the plant or department alone make out a prima facie case of discrimination
leads inevitably toward a narrowing of the Court's options in fashioning a remedy. If
the problem is to be demonstrated by the mere fact of a discrepancy, then the solution
must amount to an order to bring employment statistics into line with the population
statistics, lest the Court mandate a continuing prima facie violation. Hiring in that
manner in the first instance is not required by law.
Id. at 1193 n.5.
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ployment practices, not just to the motivation for them, 173 and the Court
recently reaffirmed this principle in Rawlinson, which, unlike Teamsters
and Hazelwood, did not concern purposeful discrimination. 17 4 Thus, plain-
tiff need not plead and prove intentional discrimination under Title VII.
Defendant violates the Act when members of a group covered by the Act are
disproportionately excluded by employment procedures that defendant
cannot show to be job related. Second, as discussed in the preceding part of
this article, the function of disparate impact analysis is to create an inference
of an exclusionary effect in defendant's employment process. Because the
Supreme Court has defined discrimination under the Act as an exclusionary
result caused by an unvalidated employment practice, statistical evidence
that creates an inference of the exclusionary effect of a particular practice
should establish plaintiff's prima facie case and shift the burden to defendant
to validate the practice. A court following Griggs should not require
evidence of intentional discrimination to establish a prima facie case when
plaintiff alleges only the discriminatory effect of defendant employer's
hiring practices.
Evidence of intentional discrimination is, of course, relevant in any
discrimination case, and testimony concerning individual encounters with
overt discrimination is desirable as a matter of litigation strategy to put life
into an otherwise numerical case. 175 Evidence of a personnel manager
telling an applicant that being a Chicano is a "strike against him" 176 or
evidence of an employer telling a woman that the job she seeks is a "man's
job' ' 7 7 provides a smoking gun that complements plaintiff's statistical
proof. Such evidence may furnish the basis for claims of individual dis-
crimination,178 or it may enhance plaintiff's disparate impact evidence in a
173. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432(1971).
174. "The gist of the claim that the statutory height and weight requirements discriminate
against women does not involve an assertion of purposeful discriminatory motive." Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2726 (1977). "[The] cases make clear that to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in question
select applicants for hire in a significantly different pattern." Id. But see Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (intent must be shown to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under a claimed constitutional violation of equal protection).
175. "The individuals who testified about their personal experiences with the company
brought the cold numbers convincingly to life." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). See generally Phillips, Discovery, Evidence, and Trial Tech-
niques-The Plaintiff Position, in HANDLING THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE 81 (G.
Holmes & Q. Story eds. 1975).
176. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 n.19 (1977).
177. See Saracini v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1604, 1606, 1609 (E.D.
Ark. 1977).
178. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972). See generally B. SCHLEI
& P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 15-25 (1976).
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class action, but testimony concerning purposeful discrimination should not
be a necessary ingredient of a class action alleging only discriminatory
effect under Griggs and based upon disparate impact analysis.
Arguably, statistical evidence of disparate impact without testimony of
overt discrimination should be sufficient for a prima facie case even in a
class action in which plaintiffs allege purposeful discrimination. Teamsters
left unanswered the question whether statistics alone can establish a plain-
tiff's Title VII claim of intentional discrimination against a class because the
question was not properly raised by the facts of that case. The Government
had alleged purposeful discrimination, but it had not relied exclusively upon
proof of disparate impact. At trial individuals testified to some forty specific
instances of overt discrimination. 179 Although the question thus remains for
the Court's consideration, 180 Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Team-
sters indirectly provides some guidance. In the footnote in which he rejects
the argument that use of disparate impact analysis conflicts with the guaran-
tee against preferential hiring, Stewart also discusses generally the use of
statistics to prove purposeful discrimination. 181 The function of disparate
impact analysis, he argues, is not to require an employer to maintain quotas,
but rather "[s]tatistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a
case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of
purposeful discrimination." 1 2 Stewart proceeds to state the rationale under-
lying the community composition comparison approach, 183 which was later
highlighted in Hazelwood, and concludes by citing with apparent approval
the following observation by the Ninth Circuit: "In many cases the only
available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine
and covert discrimination by the employer or union involved."'184
There is no compelling reason why plaintiff should be able to establish
a prima facie case with statistics alone when he alleges discriminatory effect
but not when he alleges purposeful discrimination. In either case the absence
of provable instances of overt and intentional discrimination should not
179. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977)..-
180. Several courts of appeals have similarly rejected defendants' arguments that statistics
cannot form the basis of a prima facie case, but none has addressed the issue in the absence of
other evidence of discrimination produced by plaintiff. See, e.g., Kaplan v. International
Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Masonry Contractors Assoc., Inc., 497 F.2d 871, 875 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972).
181. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
182. Id.
183. "[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired." Id.
184. Id. (quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971)).
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preclude plaintiff from attempting to create an inference of discrimination,
intentional or otherwise, with disparate impact analysis. The difference
between the two types of cases should lie in the evidence with which
defendant can properly rebut the inference. In a case in which plaintiff
alleges purposeful discrimination, defendant should be able to rebut plain-
tiff's disparate impact case with proof of good faith. Affirmative action
plans, active recruitment of under-represented groups, and applicant flow
statistics should all be more persuasive to rebut the inference of purposeful
discrimination than they are to rebut the inference of discriminatory effect
under Griggs.'85 These avenues of defense would be in addition to the
possibility of showing favorable recent hiring statistics, which may be
persuasive rebuttal even in the Griggs-type case. The availability of statist-
ics alone to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under
Title VII remains open after Teamsters, but the Court already has addressed
the issue in the context of a constitutional claim of employment discrimina-
tion. In Washington v. Davis186 the court held that plaintiff must show
purposeful discrimination in a racial employment discrimination case based
on the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment; proof of discriminatory effect is insufficient.18 7 The Davis
Court spoke specifically to the question of the sufficiency of disparate
impact statistics to establish purpose in an equal protection case: "Dispor-
portionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing
alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations." 188 The Court conceded that in some racial discrimination
jury cases it had held that the "total or seriously disproportionate" exclu-
185. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups"); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 422 (1975) ("If backpay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the remedy
would become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a compensation for workers'
injuries."). Thus, in a Title VII effects case, district courts disregard evidence of good faith
recruitment offered by defendants to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case. See, e.g., Ensley
Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 670, 673 (N.D. Ala. 1977); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873,909, modified in part, 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
186. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Plaintiffs in Davis challenged the employment practices used in the
selection of police officers in Washington, D.C. The action originated before the amendments
to the Civil Rights Act that allowed governmental defendants, see note 91 supra, so the claim
was made under the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
187. Id. at 238-48. See generally Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
188. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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sion of blacks "may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutional-
ity because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds," 189 but it cautioned that it had not held
invalid under the equal protection clause a law neutral on its face simply
because it disproportionately affected one race. 19° It thus appears unlikely
that disparate impact statistics alone can establish the purposeful discrimina-
tion necessary to trigger strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
IV. Conclusion
The use of disparate impact analysis to establish plaintiff's prima facie
case under Title VII has acquired such a level of complexity that uniform
guidelines, judicially or administratively fashioned, are urgently needed. In
the seven years since Griggs accepted an operational definition of discrimi-
nation, lower courts have developed a variety of methods for probing
whether a particular selection requirement or an overall employment process
has the effect of excluding disproportionately any group recognized under
Title VII. The most controversial of these methods entails a comparison of
the racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of the community with the compo-
sition of the employer's work force. If the disparity revealed by this
comparison is statistically significant, there arises an inference of dis-
criminatory effect in the employment process.
The Supreme Court heard objections to the community composition
comparison approach in Hazelwood School District v. United States and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, Title VII pattern
or practice cases in which the government alleged purposeful discrimina-
tion. In the face of these objections, the Court upheld the validity of the
approach, underscoring its logic with the following statement: "[A]bsent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the
racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired."'191 The Court added a caveat to its approval,
however, by holding that defendants must be given an opportunity to rebut
plaintiff's statistics with post-Act hiring data and perhaps applicant flow
data.
The new Agency Guidelines have also sparked controversy, partly
because they measure disparate impact with applicant flow data and partly
189. Id.
190. Id. at 243-44.
191. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2741 (1977) (quoting Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)).
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because they resolve the issue of single requirement impact in the absence of
overall hiring impact in favor of a bottom line approach. As the Supreme
Court explained in Dothard v. Rawlinson, applicant flow data may be an
unreliable measure of discriminatory effect because the phenomenon of self
selection may distort the applicant pool. Moreover, the bottom line ap-
proach of the guidelines permits the use of unvalidated discriminatory
requirements as long as there are counterbalancing requirements producing
an overall acceptance rate that compares favorably with the composition of
the applicant pool. This encourages employers to avoid charges of discrimi-
nation by adopting a disguised quota system under which hiring practices
include subjective interviews or other unvalidated requirements known to
produce an acceptable representation of each group.
The goal of the new Agency Guidelines, greater simplicity and certain-
ty in disparate impact analysis, can be achieved without a bottom line-
applicant flow approach. The model suggested in this article is based on two
simple dichotomies: general skills jobs versus specialized skills jobs, and
specific employment requirements versus a subjective employment process.
Application of these dichotomies to a given set of facts allows classification
into one of six distinct categories, each of which can be properly analyzed
by procedures as easily understood as those in the guidelines. The model
proposed by the article facilitates analysis and preserves the distinctions
made by the three recent Supreme Court cases, yet avoids the pitfalls of the
Agency Guidelines.
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